

PSYCHOLOGY TEACHERS UPDATE

NO.14 - JANUARY 2007
SUPPLEMENT NO.2

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY
IN RECENT YEARS

KEVIN BREWER

ISSN: 1478-4548

Orsett Psychological Services
PO Box 179
Grays
Essex
RM16 3EW
UK

orsettpsychologicalservices@phonecoop.coop

PSYCHOLOGY TEACHERS UPDATE

Psychology Teachers Update is designed to give a brief overview of the main developments in the different areas of psychology. There is a proliferation of journals and research, and it is very difficult to keep abreast of the latest trends, particularly in the many and varied areas of psychology.

Each issue of Psychology Teachers Update will cover a particular topic, and summarise the main research directions and findings in the last ten to fifteen years approximately. The aim is to give teachers the feel of what is happening in that area of psychology.

AUTHOR

Kevin Brewer

Kevin is an experienced teacher of A level psychology since the 1980s. He has taught and examined with many of the different exam boards. He is a social psychology tutor with the Open University.

Author of three books published by Heinemann: "Psychology and Crime" (2000) and "Clinical Psychology" (2001) as sole author, and "Heinemann Psychology AS for AQA A" (2003) by David Moxon, Kevin Brewer, and Peter Emmerson. Kevin has published other material himself.

A complete list is available at
<http://kmbpsychology.jottit.com>.

PAST ISSUES

- No.1 - September 2002: Memory
- No.2 - January 2003: Evolutionary Psychology
- No.3 - May 2003: Biological Psychiatry
- No.4 - September 2003: Social Constructionism
- No.5 - January 2004: Atypical Development
- No.6 - May 2004: Issues in Health Psychology
- No.7 - Sept 2004: Developmental Psychology
- No.7 Supplement (No.1): Child Physical Abuse,
Neglect and Disadvantage
- No.8 - January 2005: Children in Court
- No.9 - May 2005: An Introduction to Psychoneuroimmunology
- No. 10 - September 2005: Qualitative Psychology and
Research Methods
- No.11 - January 2006: Altruism and Helping Behaviour
- No.12 - May 2006: Sleep
- No.13 - September 2006: Psychology of Ageing and Older
Adults
- No.14 - January 2007: Social Psychology

CONTENTS

	Page Number
THEORIES AND RESEARCH ON INTERGROUP CONFLICT SINCE TAJFEL	4
Using Social Identity Theory to Explain Intergroup Conflict	4
Using Social Identity Theory to Reduce Intergroup Conflict	6
Cross Categorisation Model	9
 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND SELF-ESTEEM	 13
 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY	 15
 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND GROUP INTERESTS	 18
 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND GROUP-BASED GUILT	 21
 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND CROWDS	 24
 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND STRESS	 26

Theories and Research on Intergroup Conflict since Tajfel

USING SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY TO EXPLAIN INTERGROUP CONFLICT

"The pervasiveness of classification into social categories as a bedrock of intergroup relations is evident in all strata of social life.." (Crisp 2002 p612). While Haghghat (2001) felt that with the increasing forms of communication and media, it "makes us codify and categorise more than ever before".

The Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986) (and minimal group paradigm) proposed that ingroup/outgroup conflicts developed from social categorisation, social identification, and social comparison of others. It focuses upon the thinking (cognitive aspect) involved in prejudice.

These ideas have been worked upon by other researchers.

1. Positive-negative asymmetry effect (PNAE) (Mummendey et al 1992)

One key aspect of the Social Identity Theory was the favouritism towards the ingroup with rewards (positive outcome) and discrimination against the outgroup. But when it is the allocation of negative outcomes (eg: unpleasant tasks, punishments), this favouritism and discrimination does not occur. Mummendey et al (1992) called this the "positive-negative asymmetry effect" (PNAE).

Support comes from Amiot and Bourhis (2005), who used 197 students from a French language college in Montreal, Canada, and a business game for their experiment. Two groups ("W" and "K") were formed by a coin toss for each participant. Part of the game was to allocate salary increases (positive outcome) or decreases (negative outcome) to both groups.

Three types of salary allocation were used (in the tradition of Tajfel): parity (P), maximum differentiation (MD), and maximum joint profit (MJP) (table 4.1).

In the first part of the experiment, pre-consensus phase, the participants decided alone about salaries. Here there was ingroup-outgroup discrimination for both positive and negative outcomes. Also individuals in those groups with more power (which was randomly allocated)

discriminated more.

In the consensus phase, the group members discussed their decisions, and, finally, the post-consensus phase of the experiment, the individuals made their decisions alone again. In the latter two phases, group members discriminated less on salary cuts than on salary increases, as predicted by PNAE (table 4.2).

	SALARY INCREASE	SALARY DECREASE
PARITY	same amount to ingroup (eg: 5%) as to outgroup (eg: 5%)	same amount to ingroup (eg: 5%) as to outgroup (eg: 5%)
MAXIMUM DIFFERENTIATION	large increase to ingroup (eg: 15%) and small increase to outgroup (eg: 5%)	large decrease to outgroup (eg: 15%) and small decrease to ingroup (eg: 5%)
MAXIMUM JOINT PROFIT	slightly larger increase to ingroup (eg: 9%) as to outgroup (eg: 6%)	slightly less decrease to ingroup (eg: 3%) as to outgroup (eg: 6%)

Table 4.1 - Types of salary allocation used.

Individuals more likely to choose:	POSITIVE OUTCOME	NEGATIVE OUTCOME	PNAE
PRE-CONSENSUS PHASE	MD	MD	opposite to predicted
CONSENSUS	MD	MJP or P	support
POST-CONSENSUS	MD	MJP or P	support

Table 4.2 - Principles of the results in Amiot and Bourhis (2005).

However, there are situations where PNAE does not apply, and discrimination occurs for both positive and negative outcomes. These situations include being a member of a minority or low status group; or in an environment that legitimates discrimination for a good cause (Amiot and Bourhis 2005).

2. Social Identity model of Deindividuation phenomena (SIDE) (Reicher et al 1995)

Reicher et al (1995) proposed the Social Identity model of Deindividuation phenomena (SIDE) as a

development on the Social Identity Theory. Using the idea of deindividuation (loss of individuality) from crowd research, SIDE argued that increasing the visibility of ingroup members or cues (like group symbols) increases immersion in the group, and thereby increases ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination.

This process is further enhanced where the outgroup has the power to sanction ingroup members. In other words, the ingroup bond together stronger when under perceived or real attack from the outgroup, and the ingroup emphasises its group norms and/or distinctiveness.

Put another way, the visibility of the ingroup increases support to each other, and encourages the expressions of aspects that draw sanctions from the outgroup.

Reicher et al (1998) undertook the first experimental studies of this theory. Fifty-eight psychology undergraduates at Exeter University were used in an experiment based on student and staff views on university activities.

A list of activities was produced that contained three categories of items:

i) Normal activities for students which staff would find acceptable (known as "A"); eg: "there is no point in being at university if one doesn't take full advantage of the social life";

ii) Normal activities for students which staff would punish ("P"); eg: "it is fine to give false excuses if one didn't prepare for a seminar";

iii) Activities not normal for students ("CN") (control condition); eg: "one should never cheat at exams".

The students rated their support for eight items on a scale of one to seven, either in booths alone ("in-group low-visibility condition") or in the presence of other students ("in-group high-visibility condition"). SIDE predicted that in the latter condition, the students would be more aware of their ingroup (students) and the outgroup (staff), and thus emphasise this by higher ratings on "P" items. For these items, when alone the mean was 2.32 compared to 3.21 in the "in-group high-visibility condition".

This was the third of three experiments by Reicher et al (1998), and the other two (using pro and anti-fox hunting as the ingroup and outgroup) did not find results that clearly supported SIDE.

USING SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY TO REDUCE INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Brown (2000) pointed out that three main theoretical developments have occurred since the Social Identity Theory in relation to the benefits of contact and reducing intergroup conflict. They all are based around changing the salience of group identities.

1. Decategorisation: The Personalization Model (Brewer and Miller 1984)

Brewer and Miller argued that during contact between ingroup and outgroup, the salience of group boundaries should be reduced. In other words, to play down the differences between the groups. This should make individuals relate as individuals (rather than as stereotypes or group members), and reduce negative stereotypes.

Bettencourt et al (1992) created two artificial groups ("overestimators" and "underestimators") for their experiment. Then they combined individuals from both groups to do various tasks. Half the groups were instructed to focus upon the group members ("personalised" condition), and the other half to concentrate upon the task ("depersonalised" condition).

Afterwards, individual members were allowed to allocate rewards to others. Participants in the "personalised" condition showed no favouritism towards their group identity as "overestimators" or "underestimators", and no bias against the outgroup.

However, this may only apply with the majority. Minorities in such experiments showed the opposite results to above (Brown 2000).

2. Common In-Group Identity Model: Recategorisation of group identities (Gaertner et al 1993; 1999; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000)

The aim here is to subsume the previous ingroup and outgroup identities into a new "super-category". For example, "English" (ingroup) and "Scottish" (outgroup) subsumed as "British".

Gaertner et al (eg: 1989; 1990) created artificial groups in their experiments by varying the seating arrangements to produce a single group, two groups, or lone individuals. Individuals who went from two groups in the first part of the experiment to one single group in

the second part showed less bias to outgroup members (in the first part of the experiment) compared to those participants who remained in two groups in both parts of the experiment (table 4.3).

	CONDITION A	CONDITION B	CONDITION C
PART 1 formation of group identity	2 groups - ingroup/ outgroup	2 groups - ingroup/ outgroup	individuals (control)
PART 2	1 group - new "super- category"	2 groups	individuals

Table 4.3 - Three types of conditions in Gaertner et al experiments.

Both of these approaches do not necessarily generalise to reduce prejudice towards outgroup members outside the experiment. Also the lab experiments used group categories which had little significance to the participants outside the experiments (Brown 2000).

3. The Distinctive Social Identity Model: Meeting typical outgroup members (Hewstone and Brown 1986)

This approach is different to the previous two because it emphasised maintaining group boundaries. To reduce prejudice against the outgroup, individuals in the ingroup need to have pleasant encounters with stereotypical outgroup members.

Brown et al (1999) designed an experiment involving an individual co-operative encounter between sixty-four British participants and a German (confederate of the experimenter). The German was either stereotypical or not. The participants had to rate their attitudes towards Germans after the experiment. The most positive attitude came from the stereotypical condition (mean 6.43 out of 7) as opposed to the non-stereotypical condition (mean 4.32).

But if the co-operative interaction fails to achieve a common goal or becomes competitive, then prejudice will be increased towards the outgroup (Brown 2000).

Another approach to reducing prejudice through contact involves social categorisation along multiple dimensions (Cross-Categorisation Model).

CROSS CATEGORISATION MODEL (eg: Crisp and Hewstone 2000a)

The focus in the past was upon single categories (eg: male or female), whereas modern research has looked at social categorisation along multiple dimensions together (eg: young, black, male or old, white, female).

Experimental work has been done to show the use of multiple dimensions in social categorisation. Crisp, Hewstone and Cairn (2000) had participants in Northern Ireland "stories to read from the local newspaper" which varied the information about the characters involved and whether the events were positive or negative.

A short while later (forty-five minutes), the participants were given a surprise memory test about the articles read. Recall was linked to multiple social category membership rather than single categories. For example, single category membership would be Catholic participants remembering more positive facts about Catholics in the stories read. But awareness of multiple category membership meant that female Catholic participants recalled more information about female Catholics. This is an awareness of the interactive function of both categories - female and Catholic - rather than a separate new category of female Catholic.

"A consequence of activating more than a single basis for social classification is that 'others' can be classified as both the same as us and different from us at the same time" (Crisp 2002 p612).

Thus there are a number of possibilities for the evaluation of others by, for example, a young male:

a) Other young males share both social categories "young" and "male", and are "double ingroup members";

b) Young females are "mixed-category members" being similar (ingroup) on "young", but different (outgroup) on "female";

c) Elderly males are "double outgroup members" being different on both social categories.

But how are individuals with multiple social categories evaluated? For example, a young Welsh disabled male (four social categories) can evaluate others in three possible ways (Crisp 2002):

i) Additive model - the degree of similarity is important. Thus other young Welsh males (three categories) are perceived more favourably than Welsh males (two categories);

ii) Social inclusive model - any individual in one of the four social categories will be viewed as the ingroup; ie: anybody who is young or Welsh or disabled or male, and anybody with the opposite categories are the outgroup - not young, or not Welsh, or able-bodied or female;

iii) Equivalence model - all social categories, whether similar or not, are viewed equally.

However, the judgment of others as ingroup or outgroup is not fixed, but varies depending upon:

a) Mood

Individuals in a neutral mood showed the social inclusive pattern, but those participants put in a good mood (with positive feedback) showed the equivalence model; ie: they showed little ingroup favouritism and outgroup prejudice (Crisp and Hewstone 2000a).

b) Superordinate social categories

Some social categories are more inclusive than others (eg: "British" is more inclusive than "English", which is more inclusive than "Londoner").

Crisp and Hewstone (2000b) asked participants to recall names after a "filler" task. A "filler" task occurs between seeing the names and recall, and aims to influence which names are recalled. The "filler" task was to decide whether a personality characteristic was positive or negative, and reaction was measured.

Faster reaction times to positive traits and slower reaction times to negative traits were used as measures of the evaluation of the names. The names were either male or female, typically English or Welsh, and the participants were from the same social categories. Also sometimes on the computer screen "we" was flashed for 50 ms (faster than conscious perception) (or sometimes "xxxx" or "they").

The use of "we" was meant to trigger superordinate categories, and support the social inclusion model. Reaction times were faster for positive personality characteristics (and slower for negative ones) for any name that shared at least one social category compared to the double outgroup names. For example, for English male participants, shared social category names were English male, English female, and Welsh male ones, and the double outgroup was Welsh female names.

c) The number of social categories

Crisp, Hewstone and Rubin (2001) found that, in experiments involving many social categories together (university attended - Bristol or Cardiff; psychology or non-psychology students; female or male; living in university accommodation or not; 18-21 years old or older; born in or outside the UK), led to participants not using social categories to evaluate others but treated them as individuals.

This experiment was based upon Tajfel et al's (1971) "reward matrices", and found little difference in the allocation of rewards to ingroup or outgroup members when such multiple social categories were used. This supported the equivalence model of social perception.

REFERENCES

- Amiot, C.E & Bourhis, R.Y (2005) Discrimination between dominant and subordinate groups: The positive-negative asymmetry effect and normative processes, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 289-308
- Bettencourt, B.A; Brewer, M.B; Croak, M.R & Miller, N (1992) Cooperation and reduction of intergroup bias: The role of reward structure and social orientation, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 28, 301-309
- Brewer, M.B & Brown, R.J (1998) Intergroup relations. In Gilbert, D.T; Fiske, S.T & Lindzey, G (eds) *The Handbook of Social Psychology Vol II* (4th ed), Boston: McGraw-Hill
- Brewer, M.B & Miller, N (1984) Beyond the contact hypothesis: Theoretical perspectives on desegregation. In Miller, N & Brewer, M.B (eds) *Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegregation*, Orlando, FL: Academic Press
- Brown, R (2000) *Group Processes* (2nd ed), Oxford: Blackwell
- Brown, R; Vivian, J & Hewstone, M (1999) Changing attitudes through intergroup contact, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29, 741-764
- Crisp, R.J (2002) Social categorisation: Blurring the boundaries, *Psychologist*, December, 612-615
- Crisp, R.J & Hewstone, M (2000a) Crossed categorisation and intergroup bias: The moderating roles of intergroup and affective context, *Experimental Social Psychology*, 36, 357-383
- Crisp, R.J & Hewstone, M (2000b) Multiple categories and social identity. In Capozza, D & Brown, R (eds) *Social Identity Theory: Trends in Theory and Research*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
- Crisp, R.J; Hewstone, M & Cairn, E (2001) Multiple identities in Northern Ireland: Hierarchical ordering in the representation of group membership, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 40, 501-514
- Crisp, R.J; Hewstone, M & Rubin, M (2001) Does multiple categorisation reduce ingroup bias? *Personality and Social Psychology*, 27, 76-89
- Fritzsche, I & Jonas, E (2005) Gender conflict and worldview defence, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 571-581
- Gaertner, S.L & Dovidio, J.F (2000) *Reducing Ingroup Bias: The Common In-*

Group Identity Model, Philadelphia: Psychology Press

Gaertner, S.L; Mann, J.A; Murrell, A.J & Dovidio, J.F (1989) Reducing intergroup bias: The benefits of recategorization, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 239-249

Gaertner, S.L; Mann, J.A; Dovidio, J.F; Murrell, A.J & Pomare, M (1990) How does cooperation reduce intergroup bias? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59, 692-704

Gaertner, S.L; Rust, M.C; Dovidio, J.F et al (1993) The contact hypothesis: The role of common in-group identity on reducing inter-group bias, *Small Group Research*, 25, 224-249

Gaertner, S.L; Dovidio, J.F et al (1999) Reducing intergroup bias: Elements of intergroup co-operation, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76, 388-402

Haghighat, R (2001) A unitary theory of stigmatisation, *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 178, 207-215

Hewstone, M & Brown, R (1986) Contact is not enough: An outgroup perspective on the contact hypothesis. In Hewstone, M & Brown, R (eds) *Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters*, Oxford: Blackwell

Mummendey, A et al (1992) Categorisation is not enough: Intergroup discrimination in negative outcome allocation, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 28, 125-144

Reicher, S.D; Spears, R & Postmes, T (1995) A social identity model of deindividuation phenomena, *European Review of Social Psychology*, 6, 161-198

Reicher, S.D; Levine, R.M & Gordijn, E (1998) More on deindividuation, power relations between groups and expression of social identity, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 37, 15-40

Tajfel, H & Turner, J.C (1979) An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In Austin, W.G & Worchel, S (eds) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole

Tajfel, H & Turner, J.C (1986) The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In Worchel, S & Austin, W.G (eds) *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Chicago: Nelson-Hall

Tajfel, H; Flament, C; Billig, M & Bundy, R.F (1971) Social categorisation and intergroup behaviour, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 149-178

Social Identity Theory and Self-Esteem

The basis of the Social Identity Theory (S.I.T) is the minimal group paradigm (MGP). Originally devised by Rabbee and Horwitz (1969), and developed by Tajfel et al (1971). The aim is to study intergroup behaviour by isolating other variables.

There are three main aspects of the MGP (Hunter et al 2005):

i) Individuals are anonymously assigned to each group based on arbitrary criteria (eg: toss of a coin). This isolates already-existing group identities, like gender;

ii) Individuals do not physically interact with ingroup or outgroup members. This isolates variables related to appearance, like stereotypes, in the forming of a group identity;

iii) The task set for individuals does not allow self-interest in the allocation of rewards.

From a vast number of studies in different situations, the common pattern emerges that individuals will favour the ingroup over the outgroup despite the arbitrariness of the group formation. The explanation given is that ingroup favouritism leads to positive distinctiveness, positive self-identity, and increased self-esteem.

Abrams and Hogg (1988) added an extra aspect related to self-esteem: individuals with low or threatened self-esteem will increase their ingroup discrimination. This is sometimes known as the Self-Esteem Hypothesis (SEH). The studies are not completely supportive of this last point (Hunter et al 2005).

From this dispute came the distinction between aspects of identity, and the self-esteem related to each. Depending on the nature of the experiment, one of these will be activated and more relevant in the S.I.T process. The distinction has been formalised in the Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) scale (Luhtanen and Crocker 1992) which contains four subscales of CSE: private, membership, identity, and public.

Hunter et al (2005) tested the idea that individuals in the MGP "would experience an increase in that domain of self-esteem judged to be relatively more important to the in-group, following the display of in-group bias" (p334).

Two hundred and eighty first-year psychology

students were divided into four conditions randomly. The two independent variables were high or low public CSE, and group membership emphasised or not. Group membership was emphasised by drawing attention to the ingroup. Group allocation was based on preference for Klee or Kandinsky paintings (as in Tajfel et al 1971). The allocation of points followed Tajfel et al.

The study found some allocation bias towards the ingroup: mean allocation of points was 447 for the ingroup and 385 for the outgroup. Individuals showing ingroup bias had increased levels of verbal (but not global or mathematical) self-esteem as predicted by the S.I.T.

Concerning the SEH prediction, individuals with low public CSE showed significant allocation bias (234 points for the ingroup versus 185 points for the outgroup) compared to the non-significant differences of individuals with high public CSE (213 versus 200 points respectively).

Hunter et al (2005) then repeated the study design using real social categories: New Zealanders (ingroup) and Australians (outgroup), and the allocation of white noise through headphones ¹.

The same pattern of findings occurred. More white noise was allocated to the outgroup: mean duration of 212 seconds versus 194 seconds for the ingroup; and these individuals showed an increase in physical (but not mathematical) self-esteem.

Those individuals with low public CSE showed greater ingroup bias than high public CSE individuals.

In each part of the experiment, different aspects of self-esteem were measured and influenced. Certainly with the second experiment. it is the part of the self that is most relevant that was influenced, and this for New Zealanders was physical self-esteem (eg: sporting ability) compared to Australians. The sporting rivalry between the two countries is very important between them.

The conclusion is that S.I.T may only apply to aspects of identity that are relevant to the situation and not necessarily overall identity.

REFERENCES

Abrams, D & Hogg, M.A (1988) Comments on the motivational status of self-esteem in social identity and intergroup discrimination, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 18, 317-334

¹ This part of the experiment used the allocation of negative outcomes. See previous article about differences in allocation of positive and negative outcomes known as the positive-negative asymmetry effect. The findings of the second experiment of Hunter et al (2005) challenged this effect.

Hunter, J.A et al (2005) Threats to group value, domain-specific self-esteem and intergroup discrimination amongst minimal and national groups, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 329-353

Luhtanen, R & Crocker, J (1992) A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's social identity, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 18, 302-318

Rabbie, J.M & Horowitz, M (1969) The arousal of in-group bias by a chance win or loss, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 13, 269-277

Tajfel, H; Flament, C; Billig, M & Bundy, R.F (1971) Social categorisation and intergroup behaviour, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 149-178

Social Identity Theory and Terror Management Theory

Fritzsche and Jonas (2005) combined the ideas of Social Identity Theory (S.I.T) (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and Terror Management Theory (T.M.T) (Greenberg et al 1986).

T.M.T can be used to explain why individuals enhance the ingroup at the expense of the outgroup (as proposed by the S.I.T). This process is a worldview defence mechanism. For T.M.T, the potential terror of mortality leads to an embracing of cultural values and group norms to hide from that.

"As cultural in-groups are the basis for the cultural worldview, the worldview based anxiety buffer can be protected by increasing one's identification with cultural in-groups as well as by protecting and strengthening the integrity of those groups and their respective world views" (Fritzsche and Jonas 2005 p573). From this statement, it can be predicted that individuals made aware of their mortality are more likely to endorse their ingroup and its values and go against the outgroup's.

This is what Fritzsche and Jonas found in a German study on gender. The participants were thirty-one women and twenty-six men at a recruitment fair at the University of Magdeburg. The focus was the attitude towards a fictitious university course in psychology dealing with and supporting the promotion of women entitled "The University Course of Tomorrow".

Half the participants, before filling in a questionnaire about this course, had been made aware of their mortality by imagining they had an incurable disease (mortality salience). The control group had to imagine strong dental pain (figure 1).




Figure 1 - Four conditions in Fritzsche and Jonas (2005).

It was found that in the mortality salience condition for women (condition 1 in figure 1), they were more positive towards the course (ingroup) than in the control (condition 2). While men in the mortality salience condition (condition 3 in figure 1) were less positive than in condition 4 because a pro-women course is the outgroup. In the control groups, there was little difference in the mean attitude scores of men and women.

Thus, according to T.M.T, when individuals are made aware of their mortality in this experiment, women supported their ingroup (pro-women course) and men did not.

REFERENCES

Fritzsche, I & Jonas, E (2005) Gender conflict and worldview defence, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 571-581

Greenberg, J; Pyszczynski, T & Solomon, S (1986) The causes and consequences of the need for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In Baumeister, R.F (ed) *Public Self and Private Self*, New York: Springer

Tajfel, H & Turner, J.C (1986) The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In Worchel, S & Austin, W.G (eds) *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (2nd ed), Chicago: Nelson-Hall

Social Identity Theory and Group Interests

Support for a particular social policy will depend upon how a policy is perceived in relation to a group's interest. In terms of Social Identity Theory (S.I.T), this is how the policy is perceived as affecting the ingroup's standing in the social hierarchy (Garcia et al 2005).

One type of social policy is affirmative action (or positive discrimination) for disadvantaged groups (eg: women; ethnic minorities). Responding to group interest will predict that high-status groups will be against such policies because their relative status will be reduced, but low-status groups will support them because their status will be enhanced. For example, high-status groups will endorse beliefs that support their position (eg: inequality is exaggerated or those of high status are there by merit).

Evidence for high-status or advantaged groups being against policies that harm that group's interests can be seen in an experiment by Esses et al (1999). Canadian participants were told about a fictitious new immigrant group coming to their country, and asked about supporting a positive immigration policy. Half the participants received information emphasising these immigrants as a threat in the job market, and the other half just factual information about the group. The former group were less likely to support a positive immigration policy.

Support for ingroup interests will be greater when individuals have direct experience of a particular policy. Garcia et al (2005) used visitors to the Ontario Science Centre in Canada as their participants to test this idea in relation to gender. The key was whether the individuals had worked for a company that had affirmative action policies (48 men and 43 women) or not (32 men and 53 women).

Attitudes towards affirmative action policies were measured by the 17-item Perceptions of Meritocracy Inventory (PMI) (Garcia et al 2005) (eg: "Success is possible for anyone who is willing to work hard enough"), and the 11-item Neo-Sexism Scale (Tougas et al 1995) (eg: "In past years women have gotten more from the government than they deserve").

Higher scores on the PMI and the Neo-Sexism Scale will be against affirmative action. The former because it is believed that society is a meritocracy, and the latter because gender discrimination is perceived as exaggerated.

Those participants with direct experience of affirmative action policies supported their group's

interests more than those without such experience (table 1).

Male participants' higher scores on the PMI showed they believed that society should be based on merit only, and the higher score on the Neo-Sexism Scale showed that they believed gender discrimination was exaggerated in society. The lower scores of female participants were more supportive of affirmative action policies.

(scores 0-7)	MALE EXP	NO EXP	FEMALE EXP	NO EXP
PMI	4.19	3.81	3.70	3.90
Neo-Sexism Scale	3.14	2.76	2.27	2.51

Exp = experience of affirmative action policies

(After Garcia et al 2005)

Table 1 - Mean responses to two scales.

After adjusting the analysis for age, education, and political orientation, the support for group interest was even larger. The mean response in favour of affirmative action for participants who had direct experience of such policies was 5.21 for women and 3.91 for men. But in terms of participants who had no direct experience of those policies, men were marginally more supported than women (4.68 versus 4.52). This goes against a simple men versus women view of social equality (eg: social dominance theory; Pratto et al 1994). Direct experience is key to the whole process.

Evaluation of Garcia et al (2005)

i) The data are correlational. This means that claims of causality (ie: direct experience causes attitude) must be handled with caution. It is possible, but probably unlikely, that the relationship could be opposite (ie: attitude towards affirmative action causes direct experience).

ii) Participants were not asked how much they identified with their gender group.

iii) The type of employment affirmative action policy experienced was not determined.

iv) "Affirmative action" was clearly defined in the study (based on a Canadian government definition), and

explained to the participants; eg: "For example, if 40% of available candidates for a specific position are women, then companies implementing employment equity/affirmative action programs will ensure that 40% of the people holding that position are women" (Garcia et al 2005 p590).

REFERENCES

Esses, V.M et al (1999) Economic threat and attitudes towards immigrants. In Halli, S & Drieger, L (eds) Immigrant Canada: Demographic, Economic and Social Challenges, Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Garcia, D.M et al (2005) Opposition to redistributive employment policies for women: The role of policy experience and group interest, British Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 583-602

Pratto, F et al (1994) Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741-763

Tougas, F et al (1995) Neosexism: Plus ca change, plus c'est pareil, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 842-849

Social Identity Theory and Group-Based Guilt

Despite attempts to portray the ingroup as always good, and to avoid threats to its status, there are cases where individuals will accept negative things about their group. One case is group-based guilt (feeling bad about actions performed by other members of the ingroup) where there is clear responsibility for a harmful behaviour (Branscombe et al 2002).

Group-based guilt comes from the perception of the ingroup being unfairly advantaged. This guilt should predict support for restitution to the harmed outgroup (figure 1).

Doosje et al (1998) found that Dutch students who expressed guilt over the Dutch colonial occupation of Indonesia in the past were willing to support financial restitution to that country.




Figure 1 - Group-based guilt.

Group-based guilt about the ingroup's behaviour is not inevitable, and, in fact, Doosje et al (1998) found that high identified individuals can use strategies to avoid it (McGarty et al 2005):

i) Downplaying harm and ingroup responsibility; eg: Indonesia did not suffer that badly or Dutch imperialism was much less than other European countries;

ii) Questioning the appropriateness of group-based guilt; eg: past generations were to blame for Dutch imperialism not the current one;

iii) Concern about the potential cost of restitution; eg: financial payments to Indonesia would be expensive today for a small country like Holland.

Group-based guilt can be applied to situations of disadvantaged ethnic minorities and advantaged majorities. McGarty et al (2005) looked at group-based guilt towards Indigenous Australians (Aboriginals) by

Non-Indigenous Australians.

The researchers first studied perceived unfair advantage of Non-Indigenous Australians and support for an apology for past harmful behaviours to Indigenous Australians. In July 2000, questionnaires were sent to 500 Non-Indigenous Australian residents of Perth, Western Australia, and 164 replied (33% response rate). Support for an apology was measured on a seven-point scale to the question, "Do you think the federal government should say 'sorry' for past actions?". Relative advantage was measured by the question, "Do you think non-Aborigines are advantaged or disadvantaged, compared to Aborigines?". Group-based guilt was measured by a four-item scale (eg: "I feel guilty about the past and present social inequality of Aborigines").

There was a relationship between perceived advantage of Non-indigenous Australians, group-based guilt, and support for an apology to Indigenous Australians. But overall, there was little evidence of guilt (14% of respondents) or support for an apology (27% of respondents).

In a further study, McGarty et al (2005) explored the exact nature of the group-based guilt with Non-Indigenous Australians in the Canberra area (Australian Capital Territory) using the "Attitudes to Australian History" questionnaire.

Six variable were fitted into a path model of support for an apology (figure 2):

a) Social identification as Australian; eg: "I see myself as an Australian";

b) Doubt about guilt; eg: "I think that only people who were directly involved should feel guilty about incidents in the past";

c) Cost of apology; eg: "I think that apologising for the harsh treatment of Indigenous Australians in the 19th century will create compensation claims that Australia cannot afford to pay";


d) Harshness of mistreatment of Indigenous Australians;

e) Group responsibility by Non-Indigenous Australians; eg: "I think Non-Indigenous Australians should feel regret for the harmful actions of their group towards Indigenous Australians in the 19th century";

f) Group-based guilt; eg: "I think Non-Indigenous Australians today should feel guilty about negative things done to the Indigenous Australians in the 19th

century".

The level of social identification was key in the analysis. High social identifiers (ie: proud to be Australian) were more likely to have doubt about group-based guilt, and concerns about the cost of an apology, and thus to have less actual group-based guilt and less support for an apology (pathways (a) and (b) in figure 2). Those individuals who felt more group responsibility had greater group-based guilt and support for an apology (pathways (c) and (d) in figure 2).



(All standardised regression coefficients are significant at $p = 0.05$)

(After McGarty et al 2005)

Figure 2 - Path model of "support for apology" to Indigenous Australians by Non-Indigenous Australians.

REFERENCES

Branscombe, N.R; Doosje, B.J & McGarty, C (2002) Collective guilt: Antecedents, correlates and consequences. In Mackie, D.M & Smith, E.R (eds) From Prejudice to Intergroup Relations, New York: Psychology Press

Doosje, B.J et al (1998) Guilty by association: When one's group has a negative history, Journal of Personal and Social Psychology, 75, 872-886

McGarty, C et al (2005) Group-based guilt as a predictor of commitment to apology, British Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 659-680

Social Identity Theory and Crowds

Social Identity Theory tends to be used to explain small group behaviour, but it has been applied to crowd behaviour in the form of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (EISM) (Reicher 1996). The EISM explains crowd behaviour as a set of cognitions about ingroup-outgroup, and the interaction between the two.

So in terms of riots, for example, a large self-category forms in the crowd (ingroup) as opposed to the police (outgroup), with feelings of consensus, and clear legitimation for their actions (eg: police arresting someone with too much force). Any prior internal divisions of "peaceful majority" or "minority of troublemakers" is superseded by the large ingroup identity. With this comes expectations of mutual support from the ingroup against the dominant outgroup.

The ingroup against the dominant outgroup has been called "collective self-objectification" (CSO) (Drury and Reicher 2005), and includes the following features (Drury et al 2005):

i) Context change as self-change - identity depends upon the social context (eg: peaceful demonstration or riot);

ii) Novelty - the overturning of unequal power between social groups;

iii) Action as realization of legitimate practice - overturning the social order produces feelings of legitimacy and empowerment;

iv) Provisionality - the change in power relations is only temporary as the outgroup is able to reassert itself.

"If a group in resistance is able to enact its definition of legitimate practice against the dominant out-group, that action is defined as collective self-objectification, which is empowering" (Drury et al 2005 p323).

Drury et al (2005) analysed interviews with thirty-seven UK activists (eg: anti-war demonstrators in November 2001), and their understanding of empowerment. A number of factors emerged as relevant to empowerment including unity, support, movement potential, and CSO ("achievements in relation to the specific definition of their collective identity").

While disempowerment as in the failure of CSO "was evident in accounts where participants referred to lack

of impact, their action having no effect, or achieving nothing" (p318).

REFERENCES

Drury, J & Reicher, S (2005) Explaining enduring empowerment: A comparative study of collective action and psychological outcomes, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 35, 35-58

Drury, J et al (2005) The phenomenology of empowerment in collective action, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 309-328

Reicher, S (1996) Social identity and social change: Rethinking the context of social psychology. In Robinson, W.P (ed) *Social Groups and Identities*, London: Butterworth

Social Identity Theory and Stress

The Social Identity Theory has also been applied to understand the experience of stress. A shared identity will influence how the stressor is viewed as well as encourage social support (Haslam 2004).

In other words, the same stressor is perceived as stressful when one identity is emphasised (eg: facial scar as a woman), but not with another identity (eg: as physical education student) (Levine 1999).

While stress reduction is beneficial if provided by an ingroup rather than an outgroup member. For example, Haslam et al (2004) found that advice to reduce the stress of a mathematics task by seeing it as a challenge only actually reduced stress when given by the ingroup member.

Haslam et al (2005) investigated the relationship between stress and social identity among thirty-four Norwegian patients recovering at a heart surgery clinic. Three variables were measured: participants' social identification with family and friends; the amount of social support received during hospitalisation; and the subjective experience of stress.

Social identity was significantly negatively correlated with perceptions of stress ($r = -0.34$), and significantly positively correlated with life satisfaction ($r = 0.42$). More complex statistical analysis showed that these correlations were mediated by social support.

A second similar study used members of the RAF Bomb Disposal Team. The same results emerged: a significant negative correlation between work stress and social identification with workgroup ($r = -0.63$), and a significant positive correlation between work satisfaction and social identity ($r = 0.49$).

Table 1 shows the mean perceptions of stressfulness of bomb disposal officers and bar workers. Bomb disposal officers saw bar work as more stressful than their own job.

	BAR STAFF	BOMB DISPOSAL OFFICERS
(out of 7)		
Bomb disposal work	6.15	1.55
Bar work	2.90	3.35

(After Haslam et al 2005)

Table 1 - Perceived stressfulness of two jobs.

REFERENCES

Haslam, S.A (2004) *Psychology in Organisations: The Social Identity Approach* (2nd ed), London: Sage

Haslam, S.A et al (2004) Social identity, social influence, and reactions to potentially stressful tasks: Support for the self-categorization model of stress, *Stress and Health*, 20, 3-9

Haslam, S.A et al (2005) Taking the strain: Social identity, social support, and the experience of stress, *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44, 355-370

Levine, R.M (1999) Identity and illness: The effects of identity salience and frame of reference on evaluation of illness and injury, *British Journal of Health Psychology*, 4, 63-80